| 1 | // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 |
| 2 | /* |
| 3 | * Verification of builtin signatures |
| 4 | * |
| 5 | * Copyright 2019 Google LLC |
| 6 | */ |
| 7 | |
| 8 | /* |
| 9 | * This file implements verification of fs-verity builtin signatures. Please |
| 10 | * take great care before using this feature. It is not the only way to do |
| 11 | * signatures with fs-verity, and the alternatives (such as userspace signature |
| 12 | * verification, and IMA appraisal) can be much better. For details about the |
| 13 | * limitations of this feature, see Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst. |
| 14 | */ |
| 15 | |
| 16 | #include "fsverity_private.h" |
| 17 | |
| 18 | #include <linux/cred.h> |
| 19 | #include <linux/key.h> |
| 20 | #include <linux/security.h> |
| 21 | #include <linux/slab.h> |
| 22 | #include <linux/verification.h> |
| 23 | |
| 24 | /* |
| 25 | * /proc/sys/fs/verity/require_signatures |
| 26 | * If 1, all verity files must have a valid builtin signature. |
| 27 | */ |
| 28 | int fsverity_require_signatures; |
| 29 | |
| 30 | /* |
| 31 | * Keyring that contains the trusted X.509 certificates. |
| 32 | * |
| 33 | * Only root (kuid=0) can modify this. Also, root may use |
| 34 | * keyctl_restrict_keyring() to prevent any more additions. |
| 35 | */ |
| 36 | static struct key *fsverity_keyring; |
| 37 | |
| 38 | /** |
| 39 | * fsverity_verify_signature() - check a verity file's signature |
| 40 | * @vi: the file's fsverity_info |
| 41 | * @signature: the file's built-in signature |
| 42 | * @sig_size: size of signature in bytes, or 0 if no signature |
| 43 | * |
| 44 | * If the file includes a signature of its fs-verity file digest, verify it |
| 45 | * against the certificates in the fs-verity keyring. Note that signatures |
| 46 | * are verified regardless of the state of the 'fsverity_require_signatures' |
| 47 | * variable and the LSM subsystem relies on this behavior to help enforce |
| 48 | * file integrity policies. Please discuss changes with the LSM list |
| 49 | * (thank you!). |
| 50 | * |
| 51 | * Return: 0 on success (signature valid or not required); -errno on failure |
| 52 | */ |
| 53 | int fsverity_verify_signature(const struct fsverity_info *vi, |
| 54 | const u8 *signature, size_t sig_size) |
| 55 | { |
| 56 | const struct inode *inode = vi->inode; |
| 57 | const struct fsverity_hash_alg *hash_alg = vi->tree_params.hash_alg; |
| 58 | struct fsverity_formatted_digest *d; |
| 59 | int err; |
| 60 | |
| 61 | if (sig_size == 0) { |
| 62 | if (fsverity_require_signatures) { |
| 63 | fsverity_err(inode, |
| 64 | "require_signatures=1, rejecting unsigned file!" ); |
| 65 | return -EPERM; |
| 66 | } |
| 67 | return 0; |
| 68 | } |
| 69 | |
| 70 | if (fsverity_keyring->keys.nr_leaves_on_tree == 0) { |
| 71 | /* |
| 72 | * The ".fs-verity" keyring is empty, due to builtin signatures |
| 73 | * being supported by the kernel but not actually being used. |
| 74 | * In this case, verify_pkcs7_signature() would always return an |
| 75 | * error, usually ENOKEY. It could also be EBADMSG if the |
| 76 | * PKCS#7 is malformed, but that isn't very important to |
| 77 | * distinguish. So, just skip to ENOKEY to avoid the attack |
| 78 | * surface of the PKCS#7 parser, which would otherwise be |
| 79 | * reachable by any task able to execute FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY. |
| 80 | */ |
| 81 | fsverity_err(inode, |
| 82 | "fs-verity keyring is empty, rejecting signed file!" ); |
| 83 | return -ENOKEY; |
| 84 | } |
| 85 | |
| 86 | d = kzalloc(sizeof(*d) + hash_alg->digest_size, GFP_KERNEL); |
| 87 | if (!d) |
| 88 | return -ENOMEM; |
| 89 | memcpy(d->magic, "FSVerity" , 8); |
| 90 | d->digest_algorithm = cpu_to_le16(hash_alg - fsverity_hash_algs); |
| 91 | d->digest_size = cpu_to_le16(hash_alg->digest_size); |
| 92 | memcpy(d->digest, vi->file_digest, hash_alg->digest_size); |
| 93 | |
| 94 | err = verify_pkcs7_signature(data: d, len: sizeof(*d) + hash_alg->digest_size, |
| 95 | raw_pkcs7: signature, pkcs7_len: sig_size, trusted_keys: fsverity_keyring, |
| 96 | usage: VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE, |
| 97 | NULL, NULL); |
| 98 | kfree(objp: d); |
| 99 | |
| 100 | if (err) { |
| 101 | if (err == -ENOKEY) |
| 102 | fsverity_err(inode, |
| 103 | "File's signing cert isn't in the fs-verity keyring" ); |
| 104 | else if (err == -EKEYREJECTED) |
| 105 | fsverity_err(inode, "Incorrect file signature" ); |
| 106 | else if (err == -EBADMSG) |
| 107 | fsverity_err(inode, "Malformed file signature" ); |
| 108 | else |
| 109 | fsverity_err(inode, "Error %d verifying file signature" , |
| 110 | err); |
| 111 | return err; |
| 112 | } |
| 113 | |
| 114 | err = security_inode_setintegrity(inode, |
| 115 | type: LSM_INT_FSVERITY_BUILTINSIG_VALID, |
| 116 | value: signature, |
| 117 | size: sig_size); |
| 118 | |
| 119 | if (err) { |
| 120 | fsverity_err(inode, "Error %d exposing file signature to LSMs" , |
| 121 | err); |
| 122 | return err; |
| 123 | } |
| 124 | |
| 125 | return 0; |
| 126 | } |
| 127 | |
| 128 | void __init fsverity_init_signature(void) |
| 129 | { |
| 130 | fsverity_keyring = |
| 131 | keyring_alloc(description: ".fs-verity" , KUIDT_INIT(0), KGIDT_INIT(0), |
| 132 | current_cred(), KEY_POS_SEARCH | |
| 133 | KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_WRITE | |
| 134 | KEY_USR_SEARCH | KEY_USR_SETATTR, |
| 135 | KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL, NULL); |
| 136 | if (IS_ERR(fsverity_keyring)) |
| 137 | panic("failed to allocate \".fs-verity\" keyring" ); |
| 138 | } |
| 139 | |