1 | // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only |
2 | /* |
3 | * Copyright 2002-2004, Instant802 Networks, Inc. |
4 | * Copyright 2008, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> |
5 | * Copyright (C) 2016-2017 Intel Deutschland GmbH |
6 | * Copyright (C) 2020-2023 Intel Corporation |
7 | */ |
8 | |
9 | #include <linux/netdevice.h> |
10 | #include <linux/types.h> |
11 | #include <linux/skbuff.h> |
12 | #include <linux/compiler.h> |
13 | #include <linux/ieee80211.h> |
14 | #include <linux/gfp.h> |
15 | #include <asm/unaligned.h> |
16 | #include <net/mac80211.h> |
17 | #include <crypto/aes.h> |
18 | #include <crypto/utils.h> |
19 | |
20 | #include "ieee80211_i.h" |
21 | #include "michael.h" |
22 | #include "tkip.h" |
23 | #include "aes_ccm.h" |
24 | #include "aes_cmac.h" |
25 | #include "aes_gmac.h" |
26 | #include "aes_gcm.h" |
27 | #include "wpa.h" |
28 | |
29 | ieee80211_tx_result |
30 | ieee80211_tx_h_michael_mic_add(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx) |
31 | { |
32 | u8 *data, *key, *mic; |
33 | size_t data_len; |
34 | unsigned int hdrlen; |
35 | struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr; |
36 | struct sk_buff *skb = tx->skb; |
37 | struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb); |
38 | int tail; |
39 | |
40 | hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data; |
41 | if (!tx->key || tx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP || |
42 | skb->len < 24 || !ieee80211_is_data_present(fc: hdr->frame_control)) |
43 | return TX_CONTINUE; |
44 | |
45 | hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(fc: hdr->frame_control); |
46 | if (skb->len < hdrlen) |
47 | return TX_DROP; |
48 | |
49 | data = skb->data + hdrlen; |
50 | data_len = skb->len - hdrlen; |
51 | |
52 | if (unlikely(info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_INTFL_TKIP_MIC_FAILURE)) { |
53 | /* Need to use software crypto for the test */ |
54 | info->control.hw_key = NULL; |
55 | } |
56 | |
57 | if (info->control.hw_key && |
58 | (info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_CTL_DONTFRAG || |
59 | ieee80211_hw_check(&tx->local->hw, SUPPORTS_TX_FRAG)) && |
60 | !(tx->key->conf.flags & (IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC | |
61 | IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_MIC_SPACE))) { |
62 | /* hwaccel - with no need for SW-generated MMIC or MIC space */ |
63 | return TX_CONTINUE; |
64 | } |
65 | |
66 | tail = MICHAEL_MIC_LEN; |
67 | if (!info->control.hw_key) |
68 | tail += IEEE80211_TKIP_ICV_LEN; |
69 | |
70 | if (WARN(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail || |
71 | skb_headroom(skb) < IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN, |
72 | "mmic: not enough head/tail (%d/%d,%d/%d)\n" , |
73 | skb_headroom(skb), IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN, |
74 | skb_tailroom(skb), tail)) |
75 | return TX_DROP; |
76 | |
77 | mic = skb_put(skb, MICHAEL_MIC_LEN); |
78 | |
79 | if (tx->key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_MIC_SPACE) { |
80 | /* Zeroed MIC can help with debug */ |
81 | memset(mic, 0, MICHAEL_MIC_LEN); |
82 | return TX_CONTINUE; |
83 | } |
84 | |
85 | key = &tx->key->conf.key[NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_TX_MIC_KEY]; |
86 | michael_mic(key, hdr, data, data_len, mic); |
87 | if (unlikely(info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_INTFL_TKIP_MIC_FAILURE)) |
88 | mic[0]++; |
89 | |
90 | return TX_CONTINUE; |
91 | } |
92 | |
93 | |
94 | ieee80211_rx_result |
95 | ieee80211_rx_h_michael_mic_verify(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) |
96 | { |
97 | u8 *data, *key = NULL; |
98 | size_t data_len; |
99 | unsigned int hdrlen; |
100 | u8 mic[MICHAEL_MIC_LEN]; |
101 | struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb; |
102 | struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb); |
103 | struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data; |
104 | |
105 | /* |
106 | * it makes no sense to check for MIC errors on anything other |
107 | * than data frames. |
108 | */ |
109 | if (!ieee80211_is_data_present(fc: hdr->frame_control)) |
110 | return RX_CONTINUE; |
111 | |
112 | /* |
113 | * No way to verify the MIC if the hardware stripped it or |
114 | * the IV with the key index. In this case we have solely rely |
115 | * on the driver to set RX_FLAG_MMIC_ERROR in the event of a |
116 | * MIC failure report. |
117 | */ |
118 | if (status->flag & (RX_FLAG_MMIC_STRIPPED | RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED)) { |
119 | if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_MMIC_ERROR) |
120 | goto mic_fail_no_key; |
121 | |
122 | if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED) && rx->key && |
123 | rx->key->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP) |
124 | goto update_iv; |
125 | |
126 | return RX_CONTINUE; |
127 | } |
128 | |
129 | /* |
130 | * Some hardware seems to generate Michael MIC failure reports; even |
131 | * though, the frame was not encrypted with TKIP and therefore has no |
132 | * MIC. Ignore the flag them to avoid triggering countermeasures. |
133 | */ |
134 | if (!rx->key || rx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP || |
135 | !(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) |
136 | return RX_CONTINUE; |
137 | |
138 | if (rx->sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP && rx->key->conf.keyidx) { |
139 | /* |
140 | * APs with pairwise keys should never receive Michael MIC |
141 | * errors for non-zero keyidx because these are reserved for |
142 | * group keys and only the AP is sending real multicast |
143 | * frames in the BSS. |
144 | */ |
145 | return RX_DROP_U_AP_RX_GROUPCAST; |
146 | } |
147 | |
148 | if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_MMIC_ERROR) |
149 | goto mic_fail; |
150 | |
151 | hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(fc: hdr->frame_control); |
152 | if (skb->len < hdrlen + MICHAEL_MIC_LEN) |
153 | return RX_DROP_U_SHORT_MMIC; |
154 | |
155 | if (skb_linearize(skb: rx->skb)) |
156 | return RX_DROP_U_OOM; |
157 | hdr = (void *)skb->data; |
158 | |
159 | data = skb->data + hdrlen; |
160 | data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - MICHAEL_MIC_LEN; |
161 | key = &rx->key->conf.key[NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_RX_MIC_KEY]; |
162 | michael_mic(key, hdr, data, data_len, mic); |
163 | if (crypto_memneq(a: mic, b: data + data_len, MICHAEL_MIC_LEN)) |
164 | goto mic_fail; |
165 | |
166 | /* remove Michael MIC from payload */ |
167 | skb_trim(skb, len: skb->len - MICHAEL_MIC_LEN); |
168 | |
169 | update_iv: |
170 | /* update IV in key information to be able to detect replays */ |
171 | rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->security_idx].iv32 = rx->tkip.iv32; |
172 | rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->security_idx].iv16 = rx->tkip.iv16; |
173 | |
174 | return RX_CONTINUE; |
175 | |
176 | mic_fail: |
177 | rx->key->u.tkip.mic_failures++; |
178 | |
179 | mic_fail_no_key: |
180 | /* |
181 | * In some cases the key can be unset - e.g. a multicast packet, in |
182 | * a driver that supports HW encryption. Send up the key idx only if |
183 | * the key is set. |
184 | */ |
185 | cfg80211_michael_mic_failure(dev: rx->sdata->dev, addr: hdr->addr2, |
186 | key_type: is_multicast_ether_addr(addr: hdr->addr1) ? |
187 | NL80211_KEYTYPE_GROUP : |
188 | NL80211_KEYTYPE_PAIRWISE, |
189 | key_id: rx->key ? rx->key->conf.keyidx : -1, |
190 | NULL, GFP_ATOMIC); |
191 | return RX_DROP_U_MMIC_FAIL; |
192 | } |
193 | |
194 | static int tkip_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb) |
195 | { |
196 | struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data; |
197 | struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key; |
198 | struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb); |
199 | unsigned int hdrlen; |
200 | int len, tail; |
201 | u64 pn; |
202 | u8 *pos; |
203 | |
204 | if (info->control.hw_key && |
205 | !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV) && |
206 | !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE)) { |
207 | /* hwaccel - with no need for software-generated IV */ |
208 | return 0; |
209 | } |
210 | |
211 | hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(fc: hdr->frame_control); |
212 | len = skb->len - hdrlen; |
213 | |
214 | if (info->control.hw_key) |
215 | tail = 0; |
216 | else |
217 | tail = IEEE80211_TKIP_ICV_LEN; |
218 | |
219 | if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail || |
220 | skb_headroom(skb) < IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN)) |
221 | return -1; |
222 | |
223 | pos = skb_push(skb, IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN); |
224 | memmove(pos, pos + IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN, hdrlen); |
225 | pos += hdrlen; |
226 | |
227 | /* the HW only needs room for the IV, but not the actual IV */ |
228 | if (info->control.hw_key && |
229 | (info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE)) |
230 | return 0; |
231 | |
232 | /* Increase IV for the frame */ |
233 | pn = atomic64_inc_return(v: &key->conf.tx_pn); |
234 | pos = ieee80211_tkip_add_iv(pos, keyconf: &key->conf, pn); |
235 | |
236 | /* hwaccel - with software IV */ |
237 | if (info->control.hw_key) |
238 | return 0; |
239 | |
240 | /* Add room for ICV */ |
241 | skb_put(skb, IEEE80211_TKIP_ICV_LEN); |
242 | |
243 | return ieee80211_tkip_encrypt_data(ctx: &tx->local->wep_tx_ctx, |
244 | key, skb, payload: pos, payload_len: len); |
245 | } |
246 | |
247 | |
248 | ieee80211_tx_result |
249 | ieee80211_crypto_tkip_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx) |
250 | { |
251 | struct sk_buff *skb; |
252 | |
253 | ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx); |
254 | |
255 | skb_queue_walk(&tx->skbs, skb) { |
256 | if (tkip_encrypt_skb(tx, skb) < 0) |
257 | return TX_DROP; |
258 | } |
259 | |
260 | return TX_CONTINUE; |
261 | } |
262 | |
263 | |
264 | ieee80211_rx_result |
265 | ieee80211_crypto_tkip_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) |
266 | { |
267 | struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) rx->skb->data; |
268 | int hdrlen, res, hwaccel = 0; |
269 | struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key; |
270 | struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb; |
271 | struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb); |
272 | |
273 | hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(fc: hdr->frame_control); |
274 | |
275 | if (!ieee80211_is_data(fc: hdr->frame_control)) |
276 | return RX_CONTINUE; |
277 | |
278 | if (!rx->sta || skb->len - hdrlen < 12) |
279 | return RX_DROP_U_SHORT_TKIP; |
280 | |
281 | /* it may be possible to optimize this a bit more */ |
282 | if (skb_linearize(skb: rx->skb)) |
283 | return RX_DROP_U_OOM; |
284 | hdr = (void *)skb->data; |
285 | |
286 | /* |
287 | * Let TKIP code verify IV, but skip decryption. |
288 | * In the case where hardware checks the IV as well, |
289 | * we don't even get here, see ieee80211_rx_h_decrypt() |
290 | */ |
291 | if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED) |
292 | hwaccel = 1; |
293 | |
294 | res = ieee80211_tkip_decrypt_data(ctx: &rx->local->wep_rx_ctx, |
295 | key, payload: skb->data + hdrlen, |
296 | payload_len: skb->len - hdrlen, ta: rx->sta->sta.addr, |
297 | ra: hdr->addr1, only_iv: hwaccel, queue: rx->security_idx, |
298 | out_iv32: &rx->tkip.iv32, |
299 | out_iv16: &rx->tkip.iv16); |
300 | if (res != TKIP_DECRYPT_OK) |
301 | return RX_DROP_U_TKIP_FAIL; |
302 | |
303 | /* Trim ICV */ |
304 | if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_ICV_STRIPPED)) |
305 | skb_trim(skb, len: skb->len - IEEE80211_TKIP_ICV_LEN); |
306 | |
307 | /* Remove IV */ |
308 | memmove(skb->data + IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN, skb->data, hdrlen); |
309 | skb_pull(skb, IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN); |
310 | |
311 | return RX_CONTINUE; |
312 | } |
313 | |
314 | /* |
315 | * Calculate AAD for CCMP/GCMP, returning qos_tid since we |
316 | * need that in CCMP also for b_0. |
317 | */ |
318 | static u8 ccmp_gcmp_aad(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *aad, bool spp_amsdu) |
319 | { |
320 | struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (void *)skb->data; |
321 | __le16 mask_fc; |
322 | int a4_included, mgmt; |
323 | u8 qos_tid; |
324 | u16 len_a = 22; |
325 | |
326 | /* |
327 | * Mask FC: zero subtype b4 b5 b6 (if not mgmt) |
328 | * Retry, PwrMgt, MoreData, Order (if Qos Data); set Protected |
329 | */ |
330 | mgmt = ieee80211_is_mgmt(fc: hdr->frame_control); |
331 | mask_fc = hdr->frame_control; |
332 | mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_RETRY | |
333 | IEEE80211_FCTL_PM | IEEE80211_FCTL_MOREDATA); |
334 | if (!mgmt) |
335 | mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(0x0070); |
336 | mask_fc |= cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_PROTECTED); |
337 | |
338 | a4_included = ieee80211_has_a4(fc: hdr->frame_control); |
339 | if (a4_included) |
340 | len_a += 6; |
341 | |
342 | if (ieee80211_is_data_qos(fc: hdr->frame_control)) { |
343 | qos_tid = *ieee80211_get_qos_ctl(hdr); |
344 | |
345 | if (spp_amsdu) |
346 | qos_tid &= IEEE80211_QOS_CTL_TID_MASK | |
347 | IEEE80211_QOS_CTL_A_MSDU_PRESENT; |
348 | else |
349 | qos_tid &= IEEE80211_QOS_CTL_TID_MASK; |
350 | |
351 | mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_ORDER); |
352 | len_a += 2; |
353 | } else { |
354 | qos_tid = 0; |
355 | } |
356 | |
357 | /* AAD (extra authenticate-only data) / masked 802.11 header |
358 | * FC | A1 | A2 | A3 | SC | [A4] | [QC] */ |
359 | put_unaligned_be16(val: len_a, p: &aad[0]); |
360 | put_unaligned(mask_fc, (__le16 *)&aad[2]); |
361 | memcpy(&aad[4], &hdr->addrs, 3 * ETH_ALEN); |
362 | |
363 | /* Mask Seq#, leave Frag# */ |
364 | aad[22] = *((u8 *) &hdr->seq_ctrl) & 0x0f; |
365 | aad[23] = 0; |
366 | |
367 | if (a4_included) { |
368 | memcpy(&aad[24], hdr->addr4, ETH_ALEN); |
369 | aad[30] = qos_tid; |
370 | aad[31] = 0; |
371 | } else { |
372 | memset(&aad[24], 0, ETH_ALEN + IEEE80211_QOS_CTL_LEN); |
373 | aad[24] = qos_tid; |
374 | } |
375 | |
376 | return qos_tid; |
377 | } |
378 | |
379 | static void ccmp_special_blocks(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *pn, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad, |
380 | bool spp_amsdu) |
381 | { |
382 | struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data; |
383 | u8 qos_tid = ccmp_gcmp_aad(skb, aad, spp_amsdu); |
384 | |
385 | /* In CCM, the initial vectors (IV) used for CTR mode encryption and CBC |
386 | * mode authentication are not allowed to collide, yet both are derived |
387 | * from this vector b_0. We only set L := 1 here to indicate that the |
388 | * data size can be represented in (L+1) bytes. The CCM layer will take |
389 | * care of storing the data length in the top (L+1) bytes and setting |
390 | * and clearing the other bits as is required to derive the two IVs. |
391 | */ |
392 | b_0[0] = 0x1; |
393 | |
394 | /* Nonce: Nonce Flags | A2 | PN |
395 | * Nonce Flags: Priority (b0..b3) | Management (b4) | Reserved (b5..b7) |
396 | */ |
397 | b_0[1] = qos_tid | (ieee80211_is_mgmt(fc: hdr->frame_control) << 4); |
398 | memcpy(&b_0[2], hdr->addr2, ETH_ALEN); |
399 | memcpy(&b_0[8], pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN); |
400 | } |
401 | |
402 | static inline void ccmp_pn2hdr(u8 *hdr, u8 *pn, int key_id) |
403 | { |
404 | hdr[0] = pn[5]; |
405 | hdr[1] = pn[4]; |
406 | hdr[2] = 0; |
407 | hdr[3] = 0x20 | (key_id << 6); |
408 | hdr[4] = pn[3]; |
409 | hdr[5] = pn[2]; |
410 | hdr[6] = pn[1]; |
411 | hdr[7] = pn[0]; |
412 | } |
413 | |
414 | |
415 | static inline void ccmp_hdr2pn(u8 *pn, u8 *hdr) |
416 | { |
417 | pn[0] = hdr[7]; |
418 | pn[1] = hdr[6]; |
419 | pn[2] = hdr[5]; |
420 | pn[3] = hdr[4]; |
421 | pn[4] = hdr[1]; |
422 | pn[5] = hdr[0]; |
423 | } |
424 | |
425 | |
426 | static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb, |
427 | unsigned int mic_len) |
428 | { |
429 | struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data; |
430 | struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key; |
431 | struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb); |
432 | int hdrlen, len, tail; |
433 | u8 *pos; |
434 | u8 pn[6]; |
435 | u64 pn64; |
436 | u8 aad[CCM_AAD_LEN]; |
437 | u8 b_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; |
438 | |
439 | if (info->control.hw_key && |
440 | !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV) && |
441 | !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE) && |
442 | !((info->control.hw_key->flags & |
443 | IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV_MGMT) && |
444 | ieee80211_is_mgmt(fc: hdr->frame_control))) { |
445 | /* |
446 | * hwaccel has no need for preallocated room for CCMP |
447 | * header or MIC fields |
448 | */ |
449 | return 0; |
450 | } |
451 | |
452 | hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(fc: hdr->frame_control); |
453 | len = skb->len - hdrlen; |
454 | |
455 | if (info->control.hw_key) |
456 | tail = 0; |
457 | else |
458 | tail = mic_len; |
459 | |
460 | if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail || |
461 | skb_headroom(skb) < IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN)) |
462 | return -1; |
463 | |
464 | pos = skb_push(skb, IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN); |
465 | memmove(pos, pos + IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN, hdrlen); |
466 | |
467 | /* the HW only needs room for the IV, but not the actual IV */ |
468 | if (info->control.hw_key && |
469 | (info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE)) |
470 | return 0; |
471 | |
472 | pos += hdrlen; |
473 | |
474 | pn64 = atomic64_inc_return(v: &key->conf.tx_pn); |
475 | |
476 | pn[5] = pn64; |
477 | pn[4] = pn64 >> 8; |
478 | pn[3] = pn64 >> 16; |
479 | pn[2] = pn64 >> 24; |
480 | pn[1] = pn64 >> 32; |
481 | pn[0] = pn64 >> 40; |
482 | |
483 | ccmp_pn2hdr(hdr: pos, pn, key_id: key->conf.keyidx); |
484 | |
485 | /* hwaccel - with software CCMP header */ |
486 | if (info->control.hw_key) |
487 | return 0; |
488 | |
489 | pos += IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN; |
490 | ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, b_0, aad, |
491 | spp_amsdu: key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_SPP_AMSDU); |
492 | return ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(tfm: key->u.ccmp.tfm, b_0, aad, data: pos, data_len: len, |
493 | mic: skb_put(skb, len: mic_len)); |
494 | } |
495 | |
496 | |
497 | ieee80211_tx_result |
498 | ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, |
499 | unsigned int mic_len) |
500 | { |
501 | struct sk_buff *skb; |
502 | |
503 | ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx); |
504 | |
505 | skb_queue_walk(&tx->skbs, skb) { |
506 | if (ccmp_encrypt_skb(tx, skb, mic_len) < 0) |
507 | return TX_DROP; |
508 | } |
509 | |
510 | return TX_CONTINUE; |
511 | } |
512 | |
513 | |
514 | ieee80211_rx_result |
515 | ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx, |
516 | unsigned int mic_len) |
517 | { |
518 | struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)rx->skb->data; |
519 | int hdrlen; |
520 | struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key; |
521 | struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb; |
522 | struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb); |
523 | u8 pn[IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN]; |
524 | int data_len; |
525 | int queue; |
526 | |
527 | hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(fc: hdr->frame_control); |
528 | |
529 | if (!ieee80211_is_data(fc: hdr->frame_control) && |
530 | !ieee80211_is_robust_mgmt_frame(skb)) |
531 | return RX_CONTINUE; |
532 | |
533 | if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED) { |
534 | if (!pskb_may_pull(skb: rx->skb, len: hdrlen + IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN)) |
535 | return RX_DROP_U_SHORT_CCMP; |
536 | if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_MIC_STRIPPED) |
537 | mic_len = 0; |
538 | } else { |
539 | if (skb_linearize(skb: rx->skb)) |
540 | return RX_DROP_U_OOM; |
541 | } |
542 | |
543 | /* reload hdr - skb might have been reallocated */ |
544 | hdr = (void *)rx->skb->data; |
545 | |
546 | data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN - mic_len; |
547 | if (!rx->sta || data_len < 0) |
548 | return RX_DROP_U_SHORT_CCMP; |
549 | |
550 | if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_PN_VALIDATED)) { |
551 | int res; |
552 | |
553 | ccmp_hdr2pn(pn, hdr: skb->data + hdrlen); |
554 | |
555 | queue = rx->security_idx; |
556 | |
557 | res = memcmp(p: pn, q: key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue], |
558 | IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN); |
559 | if (res < 0 || |
560 | (!res && !(status->flag & RX_FLAG_ALLOW_SAME_PN))) { |
561 | key->u.ccmp.replays++; |
562 | return RX_DROP_U_REPLAY; |
563 | } |
564 | |
565 | if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) { |
566 | u8 aad[2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; |
567 | u8 b_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; |
568 | /* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */ |
569 | ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, b_0, aad, |
570 | spp_amsdu: key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_SPP_AMSDU); |
571 | |
572 | if (ieee80211_aes_ccm_decrypt( |
573 | tfm: key->u.ccmp.tfm, b_0, aad, |
574 | data: skb->data + hdrlen + IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN, |
575 | data_len, |
576 | mic: skb->data + skb->len - mic_len)) |
577 | return RX_DROP_U_MIC_FAIL; |
578 | } |
579 | |
580 | memcpy(key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue], pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN); |
581 | if (unlikely(ieee80211_is_frag(hdr))) |
582 | memcpy(rx->ccm_gcm.pn, pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN); |
583 | } |
584 | |
585 | /* Remove CCMP header and MIC */ |
586 | if (pskb_trim(skb, len: skb->len - mic_len)) |
587 | return RX_DROP_U_SHORT_CCMP_MIC; |
588 | memmove(skb->data + IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN, skb->data, hdrlen); |
589 | skb_pull(skb, IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN); |
590 | |
591 | return RX_CONTINUE; |
592 | } |
593 | |
594 | static void gcmp_special_blocks(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *pn, u8 *j_0, u8 *aad, |
595 | bool spp_amsdu) |
596 | { |
597 | struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (void *)skb->data; |
598 | |
599 | memcpy(j_0, hdr->addr2, ETH_ALEN); |
600 | memcpy(&j_0[ETH_ALEN], pn, IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN); |
601 | j_0[13] = 0; |
602 | j_0[14] = 0; |
603 | j_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1] = 0x01; |
604 | |
605 | ccmp_gcmp_aad(skb, aad, spp_amsdu); |
606 | } |
607 | |
608 | static inline void gcmp_pn2hdr(u8 *hdr, const u8 *pn, int key_id) |
609 | { |
610 | hdr[0] = pn[5]; |
611 | hdr[1] = pn[4]; |
612 | hdr[2] = 0; |
613 | hdr[3] = 0x20 | (key_id << 6); |
614 | hdr[4] = pn[3]; |
615 | hdr[5] = pn[2]; |
616 | hdr[6] = pn[1]; |
617 | hdr[7] = pn[0]; |
618 | } |
619 | |
620 | static inline void gcmp_hdr2pn(u8 *pn, const u8 *hdr) |
621 | { |
622 | pn[0] = hdr[7]; |
623 | pn[1] = hdr[6]; |
624 | pn[2] = hdr[5]; |
625 | pn[3] = hdr[4]; |
626 | pn[4] = hdr[1]; |
627 | pn[5] = hdr[0]; |
628 | } |
629 | |
630 | static int gcmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb) |
631 | { |
632 | struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data; |
633 | struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key; |
634 | struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb); |
635 | int hdrlen, len, tail; |
636 | u8 *pos; |
637 | u8 pn[6]; |
638 | u64 pn64; |
639 | u8 aad[GCM_AAD_LEN]; |
640 | u8 j_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; |
641 | |
642 | if (info->control.hw_key && |
643 | !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV) && |
644 | !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE) && |
645 | !((info->control.hw_key->flags & |
646 | IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV_MGMT) && |
647 | ieee80211_is_mgmt(fc: hdr->frame_control))) { |
648 | /* hwaccel has no need for preallocated room for GCMP |
649 | * header or MIC fields |
650 | */ |
651 | return 0; |
652 | } |
653 | |
654 | hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(fc: hdr->frame_control); |
655 | len = skb->len - hdrlen; |
656 | |
657 | if (info->control.hw_key) |
658 | tail = 0; |
659 | else |
660 | tail = IEEE80211_GCMP_MIC_LEN; |
661 | |
662 | if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail || |
663 | skb_headroom(skb) < IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN)) |
664 | return -1; |
665 | |
666 | pos = skb_push(skb, IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN); |
667 | memmove(pos, pos + IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN, hdrlen); |
668 | skb_set_network_header(skb, offset: skb_network_offset(skb) + |
669 | IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN); |
670 | |
671 | /* the HW only needs room for the IV, but not the actual IV */ |
672 | if (info->control.hw_key && |
673 | (info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE)) |
674 | return 0; |
675 | |
676 | pos += hdrlen; |
677 | |
678 | pn64 = atomic64_inc_return(v: &key->conf.tx_pn); |
679 | |
680 | pn[5] = pn64; |
681 | pn[4] = pn64 >> 8; |
682 | pn[3] = pn64 >> 16; |
683 | pn[2] = pn64 >> 24; |
684 | pn[1] = pn64 >> 32; |
685 | pn[0] = pn64 >> 40; |
686 | |
687 | gcmp_pn2hdr(hdr: pos, pn, key_id: key->conf.keyidx); |
688 | |
689 | /* hwaccel - with software GCMP header */ |
690 | if (info->control.hw_key) |
691 | return 0; |
692 | |
693 | pos += IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN; |
694 | gcmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, j_0, aad, |
695 | spp_amsdu: key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_SPP_AMSDU); |
696 | return ieee80211_aes_gcm_encrypt(tfm: key->u.gcmp.tfm, j_0, aad, data: pos, data_len: len, |
697 | mic: skb_put(skb, IEEE80211_GCMP_MIC_LEN)); |
698 | } |
699 | |
700 | ieee80211_tx_result |
701 | ieee80211_crypto_gcmp_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx) |
702 | { |
703 | struct sk_buff *skb; |
704 | |
705 | ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx); |
706 | |
707 | skb_queue_walk(&tx->skbs, skb) { |
708 | if (gcmp_encrypt_skb(tx, skb) < 0) |
709 | return TX_DROP; |
710 | } |
711 | |
712 | return TX_CONTINUE; |
713 | } |
714 | |
715 | ieee80211_rx_result |
716 | ieee80211_crypto_gcmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) |
717 | { |
718 | struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)rx->skb->data; |
719 | int hdrlen; |
720 | struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key; |
721 | struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb; |
722 | struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb); |
723 | u8 pn[IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN]; |
724 | int data_len, queue, mic_len = IEEE80211_GCMP_MIC_LEN; |
725 | |
726 | hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(fc: hdr->frame_control); |
727 | |
728 | if (!ieee80211_is_data(fc: hdr->frame_control) && |
729 | !ieee80211_is_robust_mgmt_frame(skb)) |
730 | return RX_CONTINUE; |
731 | |
732 | if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED) { |
733 | if (!pskb_may_pull(skb: rx->skb, len: hdrlen + IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN)) |
734 | return RX_DROP_U_SHORT_GCMP; |
735 | if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_MIC_STRIPPED) |
736 | mic_len = 0; |
737 | } else { |
738 | if (skb_linearize(skb: rx->skb)) |
739 | return RX_DROP_U_OOM; |
740 | } |
741 | |
742 | /* reload hdr - skb might have been reallocated */ |
743 | hdr = (void *)rx->skb->data; |
744 | |
745 | data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN - mic_len; |
746 | if (!rx->sta || data_len < 0) |
747 | return RX_DROP_U_SHORT_GCMP; |
748 | |
749 | if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_PN_VALIDATED)) { |
750 | int res; |
751 | |
752 | gcmp_hdr2pn(pn, hdr: skb->data + hdrlen); |
753 | |
754 | queue = rx->security_idx; |
755 | |
756 | res = memcmp(p: pn, q: key->u.gcmp.rx_pn[queue], |
757 | IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN); |
758 | if (res < 0 || |
759 | (!res && !(status->flag & RX_FLAG_ALLOW_SAME_PN))) { |
760 | key->u.gcmp.replays++; |
761 | return RX_DROP_U_REPLAY; |
762 | } |
763 | |
764 | if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) { |
765 | u8 aad[2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; |
766 | u8 j_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; |
767 | /* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */ |
768 | gcmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, j_0, aad, |
769 | spp_amsdu: key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_SPP_AMSDU); |
770 | |
771 | if (ieee80211_aes_gcm_decrypt( |
772 | tfm: key->u.gcmp.tfm, j_0, aad, |
773 | data: skb->data + hdrlen + IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN, |
774 | data_len, |
775 | mic: skb->data + skb->len - |
776 | IEEE80211_GCMP_MIC_LEN)) |
777 | return RX_DROP_U_MIC_FAIL; |
778 | } |
779 | |
780 | memcpy(key->u.gcmp.rx_pn[queue], pn, IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN); |
781 | if (unlikely(ieee80211_is_frag(hdr))) |
782 | memcpy(rx->ccm_gcm.pn, pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN); |
783 | } |
784 | |
785 | /* Remove GCMP header and MIC */ |
786 | if (pskb_trim(skb, len: skb->len - mic_len)) |
787 | return RX_DROP_U_SHORT_GCMP_MIC; |
788 | memmove(skb->data + IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN, skb->data, hdrlen); |
789 | skb_pull(skb, IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN); |
790 | |
791 | return RX_CONTINUE; |
792 | } |
793 | |
794 | static void bip_aad(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *aad) |
795 | { |
796 | __le16 mask_fc; |
797 | struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data; |
798 | |
799 | /* BIP AAD: FC(masked) || A1 || A2 || A3 */ |
800 | |
801 | /* FC type/subtype */ |
802 | /* Mask FC Retry, PwrMgt, MoreData flags to zero */ |
803 | mask_fc = hdr->frame_control; |
804 | mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_RETRY | IEEE80211_FCTL_PM | |
805 | IEEE80211_FCTL_MOREDATA); |
806 | put_unaligned(mask_fc, (__le16 *) &aad[0]); |
807 | /* A1 || A2 || A3 */ |
808 | memcpy(aad + 2, &hdr->addrs, 3 * ETH_ALEN); |
809 | } |
810 | |
811 | |
812 | static inline void bip_ipn_set64(u8 *d, u64 pn) |
813 | { |
814 | *d++ = pn; |
815 | *d++ = pn >> 8; |
816 | *d++ = pn >> 16; |
817 | *d++ = pn >> 24; |
818 | *d++ = pn >> 32; |
819 | *d = pn >> 40; |
820 | } |
821 | |
822 | static inline void bip_ipn_swap(u8 *d, const u8 *s) |
823 | { |
824 | *d++ = s[5]; |
825 | *d++ = s[4]; |
826 | *d++ = s[3]; |
827 | *d++ = s[2]; |
828 | *d++ = s[1]; |
829 | *d = s[0]; |
830 | } |
831 | |
832 | |
833 | ieee80211_tx_result |
834 | ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx) |
835 | { |
836 | struct sk_buff *skb; |
837 | struct ieee80211_tx_info *info; |
838 | struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key; |
839 | struct ieee80211_mmie *mmie; |
840 | u8 aad[20]; |
841 | u64 pn64; |
842 | |
843 | if (WARN_ON(skb_queue_len(&tx->skbs) != 1)) |
844 | return TX_DROP; |
845 | |
846 | skb = skb_peek(list_: &tx->skbs); |
847 | |
848 | info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb); |
849 | |
850 | if (info->control.hw_key && |
851 | !(key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIE)) |
852 | return TX_CONTINUE; |
853 | |
854 | if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < sizeof(*mmie))) |
855 | return TX_DROP; |
856 | |
857 | mmie = skb_put(skb, len: sizeof(*mmie)); |
858 | mmie->element_id = WLAN_EID_MMIE; |
859 | mmie->length = sizeof(*mmie) - 2; |
860 | mmie->key_id = cpu_to_le16(key->conf.keyidx); |
861 | |
862 | /* PN = PN + 1 */ |
863 | pn64 = atomic64_inc_return(v: &key->conf.tx_pn); |
864 | |
865 | bip_ipn_set64(d: mmie->sequence_number, pn: pn64); |
866 | |
867 | if (info->control.hw_key) |
868 | return TX_CONTINUE; |
869 | |
870 | bip_aad(skb, aad); |
871 | |
872 | /* |
873 | * MIC = AES-128-CMAC(IGTK, AAD || Management Frame Body || MMIE, 64) |
874 | */ |
875 | ieee80211_aes_cmac(tfm: key->u.aes_cmac.tfm, aad, |
876 | data: skb->data + 24, data_len: skb->len - 24, mic: mmie->mic); |
877 | |
878 | return TX_CONTINUE; |
879 | } |
880 | |
881 | ieee80211_tx_result |
882 | ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_256_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx) |
883 | { |
884 | struct sk_buff *skb; |
885 | struct ieee80211_tx_info *info; |
886 | struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key; |
887 | struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *mmie; |
888 | u8 aad[20]; |
889 | u64 pn64; |
890 | |
891 | if (WARN_ON(skb_queue_len(&tx->skbs) != 1)) |
892 | return TX_DROP; |
893 | |
894 | skb = skb_peek(list_: &tx->skbs); |
895 | |
896 | info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb); |
897 | |
898 | if (info->control.hw_key) |
899 | return TX_CONTINUE; |
900 | |
901 | if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < sizeof(*mmie))) |
902 | return TX_DROP; |
903 | |
904 | mmie = skb_put(skb, len: sizeof(*mmie)); |
905 | mmie->element_id = WLAN_EID_MMIE; |
906 | mmie->length = sizeof(*mmie) - 2; |
907 | mmie->key_id = cpu_to_le16(key->conf.keyidx); |
908 | |
909 | /* PN = PN + 1 */ |
910 | pn64 = atomic64_inc_return(v: &key->conf.tx_pn); |
911 | |
912 | bip_ipn_set64(d: mmie->sequence_number, pn: pn64); |
913 | |
914 | bip_aad(skb, aad); |
915 | |
916 | /* MIC = AES-256-CMAC(IGTK, AAD || Management Frame Body || MMIE, 128) |
917 | */ |
918 | ieee80211_aes_cmac_256(tfm: key->u.aes_cmac.tfm, aad, |
919 | data: skb->data + 24, data_len: skb->len - 24, mic: mmie->mic); |
920 | |
921 | return TX_CONTINUE; |
922 | } |
923 | |
924 | ieee80211_rx_result |
925 | ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) |
926 | { |
927 | struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb; |
928 | struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb); |
929 | struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key; |
930 | struct ieee80211_mmie *mmie; |
931 | u8 aad[20], mic[8], ipn[6]; |
932 | struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data; |
933 | |
934 | if (!ieee80211_is_mgmt(fc: hdr->frame_control)) |
935 | return RX_CONTINUE; |
936 | |
937 | /* management frames are already linear */ |
938 | |
939 | if (skb->len < 24 + sizeof(*mmie)) |
940 | return RX_DROP_U_SHORT_CMAC; |
941 | |
942 | mmie = (struct ieee80211_mmie *) |
943 | (skb->data + skb->len - sizeof(*mmie)); |
944 | if (mmie->element_id != WLAN_EID_MMIE || |
945 | mmie->length != sizeof(*mmie) - 2) |
946 | return RX_DROP_U_BAD_MMIE; /* Invalid MMIE */ |
947 | |
948 | bip_ipn_swap(d: ipn, s: mmie->sequence_number); |
949 | |
950 | if (memcmp(p: ipn, q: key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn, size: 6) <= 0) { |
951 | key->u.aes_cmac.replays++; |
952 | return RX_DROP_U_REPLAY; |
953 | } |
954 | |
955 | if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) { |
956 | /* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */ |
957 | bip_aad(skb, aad); |
958 | ieee80211_aes_cmac(tfm: key->u.aes_cmac.tfm, aad, |
959 | data: skb->data + 24, data_len: skb->len - 24, mic); |
960 | if (crypto_memneq(a: mic, b: mmie->mic, size: sizeof(mmie->mic))) { |
961 | key->u.aes_cmac.icverrors++; |
962 | return RX_DROP_U_MIC_FAIL; |
963 | } |
964 | } |
965 | |
966 | memcpy(key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn, ipn, 6); |
967 | |
968 | /* Remove MMIE */ |
969 | skb_trim(skb, len: skb->len - sizeof(*mmie)); |
970 | |
971 | return RX_CONTINUE; |
972 | } |
973 | |
974 | ieee80211_rx_result |
975 | ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_256_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) |
976 | { |
977 | struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb; |
978 | struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb); |
979 | struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key; |
980 | struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *mmie; |
981 | u8 aad[20], mic[16], ipn[6]; |
982 | struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data; |
983 | |
984 | if (!ieee80211_is_mgmt(fc: hdr->frame_control)) |
985 | return RX_CONTINUE; |
986 | |
987 | /* management frames are already linear */ |
988 | |
989 | if (skb->len < 24 + sizeof(*mmie)) |
990 | return RX_DROP_U_SHORT_CMAC256; |
991 | |
992 | mmie = (struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *) |
993 | (skb->data + skb->len - sizeof(*mmie)); |
994 | if (mmie->element_id != WLAN_EID_MMIE || |
995 | mmie->length != sizeof(*mmie) - 2) |
996 | return RX_DROP_U_BAD_MMIE; /* Invalid MMIE */ |
997 | |
998 | bip_ipn_swap(d: ipn, s: mmie->sequence_number); |
999 | |
1000 | if (memcmp(p: ipn, q: key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn, size: 6) <= 0) { |
1001 | key->u.aes_cmac.replays++; |
1002 | return RX_DROP_U_REPLAY; |
1003 | } |
1004 | |
1005 | if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) { |
1006 | /* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */ |
1007 | bip_aad(skb, aad); |
1008 | ieee80211_aes_cmac_256(tfm: key->u.aes_cmac.tfm, aad, |
1009 | data: skb->data + 24, data_len: skb->len - 24, mic); |
1010 | if (crypto_memneq(a: mic, b: mmie->mic, size: sizeof(mmie->mic))) { |
1011 | key->u.aes_cmac.icverrors++; |
1012 | return RX_DROP_U_MIC_FAIL; |
1013 | } |
1014 | } |
1015 | |
1016 | memcpy(key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn, ipn, 6); |
1017 | |
1018 | /* Remove MMIE */ |
1019 | skb_trim(skb, len: skb->len - sizeof(*mmie)); |
1020 | |
1021 | return RX_CONTINUE; |
1022 | } |
1023 | |
1024 | ieee80211_tx_result |
1025 | ieee80211_crypto_aes_gmac_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx) |
1026 | { |
1027 | struct sk_buff *skb; |
1028 | struct ieee80211_tx_info *info; |
1029 | struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key; |
1030 | struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *mmie; |
1031 | struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr; |
1032 | u8 aad[GMAC_AAD_LEN]; |
1033 | u64 pn64; |
1034 | u8 nonce[GMAC_NONCE_LEN]; |
1035 | |
1036 | if (WARN_ON(skb_queue_len(&tx->skbs) != 1)) |
1037 | return TX_DROP; |
1038 | |
1039 | skb = skb_peek(list_: &tx->skbs); |
1040 | |
1041 | info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb); |
1042 | |
1043 | if (info->control.hw_key) |
1044 | return TX_CONTINUE; |
1045 | |
1046 | if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < sizeof(*mmie))) |
1047 | return TX_DROP; |
1048 | |
1049 | mmie = skb_put(skb, len: sizeof(*mmie)); |
1050 | mmie->element_id = WLAN_EID_MMIE; |
1051 | mmie->length = sizeof(*mmie) - 2; |
1052 | mmie->key_id = cpu_to_le16(key->conf.keyidx); |
1053 | |
1054 | /* PN = PN + 1 */ |
1055 | pn64 = atomic64_inc_return(v: &key->conf.tx_pn); |
1056 | |
1057 | bip_ipn_set64(d: mmie->sequence_number, pn: pn64); |
1058 | |
1059 | bip_aad(skb, aad); |
1060 | |
1061 | hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data; |
1062 | memcpy(nonce, hdr->addr2, ETH_ALEN); |
1063 | bip_ipn_swap(d: nonce + ETH_ALEN, s: mmie->sequence_number); |
1064 | |
1065 | /* MIC = AES-GMAC(IGTK, AAD || Management Frame Body || MMIE, 128) */ |
1066 | if (ieee80211_aes_gmac(tfm: key->u.aes_gmac.tfm, aad, nonce, |
1067 | data: skb->data + 24, data_len: skb->len - 24, mic: mmie->mic) < 0) |
1068 | return TX_DROP; |
1069 | |
1070 | return TX_CONTINUE; |
1071 | } |
1072 | |
1073 | ieee80211_rx_result |
1074 | ieee80211_crypto_aes_gmac_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) |
1075 | { |
1076 | struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb; |
1077 | struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb); |
1078 | struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key; |
1079 | struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *mmie; |
1080 | u8 aad[GMAC_AAD_LEN], *mic, ipn[6], nonce[GMAC_NONCE_LEN]; |
1081 | struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data; |
1082 | |
1083 | if (!ieee80211_is_mgmt(fc: hdr->frame_control)) |
1084 | return RX_CONTINUE; |
1085 | |
1086 | /* management frames are already linear */ |
1087 | |
1088 | if (skb->len < 24 + sizeof(*mmie)) |
1089 | return RX_DROP_U_SHORT_GMAC; |
1090 | |
1091 | mmie = (struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *) |
1092 | (skb->data + skb->len - sizeof(*mmie)); |
1093 | if (mmie->element_id != WLAN_EID_MMIE || |
1094 | mmie->length != sizeof(*mmie) - 2) |
1095 | return RX_DROP_U_BAD_MMIE; /* Invalid MMIE */ |
1096 | |
1097 | bip_ipn_swap(d: ipn, s: mmie->sequence_number); |
1098 | |
1099 | if (memcmp(p: ipn, q: key->u.aes_gmac.rx_pn, size: 6) <= 0) { |
1100 | key->u.aes_gmac.replays++; |
1101 | return RX_DROP_U_REPLAY; |
1102 | } |
1103 | |
1104 | if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) { |
1105 | /* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */ |
1106 | bip_aad(skb, aad); |
1107 | |
1108 | memcpy(nonce, hdr->addr2, ETH_ALEN); |
1109 | memcpy(nonce + ETH_ALEN, ipn, 6); |
1110 | |
1111 | mic = kmalloc(GMAC_MIC_LEN, GFP_ATOMIC); |
1112 | if (!mic) |
1113 | return RX_DROP_U_OOM; |
1114 | if (ieee80211_aes_gmac(tfm: key->u.aes_gmac.tfm, aad, nonce, |
1115 | data: skb->data + 24, data_len: skb->len - 24, |
1116 | mic) < 0 || |
1117 | crypto_memneq(a: mic, b: mmie->mic, size: sizeof(mmie->mic))) { |
1118 | key->u.aes_gmac.icverrors++; |
1119 | kfree(objp: mic); |
1120 | return RX_DROP_U_MIC_FAIL; |
1121 | } |
1122 | kfree(objp: mic); |
1123 | } |
1124 | |
1125 | memcpy(key->u.aes_gmac.rx_pn, ipn, 6); |
1126 | |
1127 | /* Remove MMIE */ |
1128 | skb_trim(skb, len: skb->len - sizeof(*mmie)); |
1129 | |
1130 | return RX_CONTINUE; |
1131 | } |
1132 | |