| 1 | use alloc::boxed::Box; |
| 2 | use alloc::vec; |
| 3 | use alloc::vec::Vec; |
| 4 | use core::fmt; |
| 5 | |
| 6 | use zeroize::Zeroize; |
| 7 | |
| 8 | use crate::common_state::{CommonState, Side}; |
| 9 | use crate::conn::ConnectionRandoms; |
| 10 | use crate::crypto; |
| 11 | use crate::crypto::cipher::{AeadKey, MessageDecrypter, MessageEncrypter, Tls12AeadAlgorithm}; |
| 12 | use crate::crypto::hash; |
| 13 | use crate::enums::{AlertDescription, SignatureScheme}; |
| 14 | use crate::error::{Error, InvalidMessage}; |
| 15 | use crate::msgs::codec::{Codec, Reader}; |
| 16 | use crate::msgs::handshake::{KeyExchangeAlgorithm, KxDecode}; |
| 17 | use crate::suites::{CipherSuiteCommon, PartiallyExtractedSecrets, SupportedCipherSuite}; |
| 18 | |
| 19 | /// A TLS 1.2 cipher suite supported by rustls. |
| 20 | pub struct Tls12CipherSuite { |
| 21 | /// Common cipher suite fields. |
| 22 | pub common: CipherSuiteCommon, |
| 23 | |
| 24 | /// How to compute the TLS1.2 PRF for the suite's hash function. |
| 25 | /// |
| 26 | /// If you have a TLS1.2 PRF implementation, you should directly implement the [`crypto::tls12::Prf`] trait. |
| 27 | /// |
| 28 | /// If not, you can implement the [`crypto::hmac::Hmac`] trait (and associated), and then use |
| 29 | /// [`crypto::tls12::PrfUsingHmac`]. |
| 30 | pub prf_provider: &'static dyn crypto::tls12::Prf, |
| 31 | |
| 32 | /// How to exchange/agree keys. |
| 33 | /// |
| 34 | /// In TLS1.2, the key exchange method (eg, Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman with Ephemeral keys -- ECDHE) |
| 35 | /// is baked into the cipher suite, but the details to achieve it are negotiated separately. |
| 36 | /// |
| 37 | /// This controls how protocol messages (like the `ClientKeyExchange` message) are interpreted |
| 38 | /// once this cipher suite has been negotiated. |
| 39 | pub kx: KeyExchangeAlgorithm, |
| 40 | |
| 41 | /// How to sign messages for authentication. |
| 42 | /// |
| 43 | /// This is a set of [`SignatureScheme`]s that are usable once this cipher suite has been |
| 44 | /// negotiated. |
| 45 | /// |
| 46 | /// The precise scheme used is then chosen from this set by the selected authentication key. |
| 47 | pub sign: &'static [SignatureScheme], |
| 48 | |
| 49 | /// How to produce a [`MessageDecrypter`] or [`MessageEncrypter`] |
| 50 | /// from raw key material. |
| 51 | pub aead_alg: &'static dyn Tls12AeadAlgorithm, |
| 52 | } |
| 53 | |
| 54 | impl Tls12CipherSuite { |
| 55 | /// Resolve the set of supported [`SignatureScheme`]s from the |
| 56 | /// offered signature schemes. If we return an empty |
| 57 | /// set, the handshake terminates. |
| 58 | pub fn resolve_sig_schemes(&self, offered: &[SignatureScheme]) -> Vec<SignatureScheme> { |
| 59 | self.sign |
| 60 | .iter() |
| 61 | .filter(|pref: &&SignatureScheme| offered.contains(pref)) |
| 62 | .cloned() |
| 63 | .collect() |
| 64 | } |
| 65 | |
| 66 | /// Return `true` if this is backed by a FIPS-approved implementation. |
| 67 | /// |
| 68 | /// This means all the constituent parts that do cryptography return `true` for `fips()`. |
| 69 | pub fn fips(&self) -> bool { |
| 70 | self.common.fips() && self.prf_provider.fips() && self.aead_alg.fips() |
| 71 | } |
| 72 | } |
| 73 | |
| 74 | impl From<&'static Tls12CipherSuite> for SupportedCipherSuite { |
| 75 | fn from(s: &'static Tls12CipherSuite) -> Self { |
| 76 | Self::Tls12(s) |
| 77 | } |
| 78 | } |
| 79 | |
| 80 | impl PartialEq for Tls12CipherSuite { |
| 81 | fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool { |
| 82 | self.common.suite == other.common.suite |
| 83 | } |
| 84 | } |
| 85 | |
| 86 | impl fmt::Debug for Tls12CipherSuite { |
| 87 | fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result { |
| 88 | f&mut DebugStruct<'_, '_>.debug_struct("Tls12CipherSuite" ) |
| 89 | .field(name:"suite" , &self.common.suite) |
| 90 | .finish() |
| 91 | } |
| 92 | } |
| 93 | |
| 94 | /// TLS1.2 per-connection keying material |
| 95 | pub(crate) struct ConnectionSecrets { |
| 96 | pub(crate) randoms: ConnectionRandoms, |
| 97 | suite: &'static Tls12CipherSuite, |
| 98 | pub(crate) master_secret: [u8; 48], |
| 99 | } |
| 100 | |
| 101 | impl ConnectionSecrets { |
| 102 | pub(crate) fn from_key_exchange( |
| 103 | kx: Box<dyn crypto::ActiveKeyExchange>, |
| 104 | peer_pub_key: &[u8], |
| 105 | ems_seed: Option<hash::Output>, |
| 106 | randoms: ConnectionRandoms, |
| 107 | suite: &'static Tls12CipherSuite, |
| 108 | ) -> Result<Self, Error> { |
| 109 | let mut ret = Self { |
| 110 | randoms, |
| 111 | suite, |
| 112 | master_secret: [0u8; 48], |
| 113 | }; |
| 114 | |
| 115 | let (label, seed) = match ems_seed { |
| 116 | Some(seed) => ("extended master secret" , Seed::Ems(seed)), |
| 117 | None => ( |
| 118 | "master secret" , |
| 119 | Seed::Randoms(join_randoms(&ret.randoms.client, &ret.randoms.server)), |
| 120 | ), |
| 121 | }; |
| 122 | |
| 123 | // The API contract for for_key_exchange is that the caller guarantees `label` and `seed` |
| 124 | // slice parameters are non-empty. |
| 125 | // `label` is guaranteed non-empty because it's assigned from a `&str` above. |
| 126 | // `seed.as_ref()` is guaranteed non-empty by documentation on the AsRef impl. |
| 127 | ret.suite |
| 128 | .prf_provider |
| 129 | .for_key_exchange( |
| 130 | &mut ret.master_secret, |
| 131 | kx, |
| 132 | peer_pub_key, |
| 133 | label.as_bytes(), |
| 134 | seed.as_ref(), |
| 135 | )?; |
| 136 | |
| 137 | Ok(ret) |
| 138 | } |
| 139 | |
| 140 | pub(crate) fn new_resume( |
| 141 | randoms: ConnectionRandoms, |
| 142 | suite: &'static Tls12CipherSuite, |
| 143 | master_secret: &[u8], |
| 144 | ) -> Self { |
| 145 | let mut ret = Self { |
| 146 | randoms, |
| 147 | suite, |
| 148 | master_secret: [0u8; 48], |
| 149 | }; |
| 150 | ret.master_secret |
| 151 | .copy_from_slice(master_secret); |
| 152 | ret |
| 153 | } |
| 154 | |
| 155 | /// Make a `MessageCipherPair` based on the given supported ciphersuite `self.suite`, |
| 156 | /// and the session's `secrets`. |
| 157 | pub(crate) fn make_cipher_pair(&self, side: Side) -> MessageCipherPair { |
| 158 | // Make a key block, and chop it up. |
| 159 | // Note: we don't implement any ciphersuites with nonzero mac_key_len. |
| 160 | let key_block = self.make_key_block(); |
| 161 | let shape = self.suite.aead_alg.key_block_shape(); |
| 162 | |
| 163 | let (client_write_key, key_block) = key_block.split_at(shape.enc_key_len); |
| 164 | let (server_write_key, key_block) = key_block.split_at(shape.enc_key_len); |
| 165 | let (client_write_iv, key_block) = key_block.split_at(shape.fixed_iv_len); |
| 166 | let (server_write_iv, extra) = key_block.split_at(shape.fixed_iv_len); |
| 167 | |
| 168 | let (write_key, write_iv, read_key, read_iv) = match side { |
| 169 | Side::Client => ( |
| 170 | client_write_key, |
| 171 | client_write_iv, |
| 172 | server_write_key, |
| 173 | server_write_iv, |
| 174 | ), |
| 175 | Side::Server => ( |
| 176 | server_write_key, |
| 177 | server_write_iv, |
| 178 | client_write_key, |
| 179 | client_write_iv, |
| 180 | ), |
| 181 | }; |
| 182 | |
| 183 | ( |
| 184 | self.suite |
| 185 | .aead_alg |
| 186 | .decrypter(AeadKey::new(read_key), read_iv), |
| 187 | self.suite |
| 188 | .aead_alg |
| 189 | .encrypter(AeadKey::new(write_key), write_iv, extra), |
| 190 | ) |
| 191 | } |
| 192 | |
| 193 | fn make_key_block(&self) -> Vec<u8> { |
| 194 | let shape = self.suite.aead_alg.key_block_shape(); |
| 195 | |
| 196 | let len = (shape.enc_key_len + shape.fixed_iv_len) * 2 + shape.explicit_nonce_len; |
| 197 | |
| 198 | let mut out = vec![0u8; len]; |
| 199 | |
| 200 | // NOTE: opposite order to above for no good reason. |
| 201 | // Don't design security protocols on drugs, kids. |
| 202 | let randoms = join_randoms(&self.randoms.server, &self.randoms.client); |
| 203 | self.suite.prf_provider.for_secret( |
| 204 | &mut out, |
| 205 | &self.master_secret, |
| 206 | b"key expansion" , |
| 207 | &randoms, |
| 208 | ); |
| 209 | |
| 210 | out |
| 211 | } |
| 212 | |
| 213 | pub(crate) fn suite(&self) -> &'static Tls12CipherSuite { |
| 214 | self.suite |
| 215 | } |
| 216 | |
| 217 | pub(crate) fn master_secret(&self) -> &[u8] { |
| 218 | &self.master_secret[..] |
| 219 | } |
| 220 | |
| 221 | fn make_verify_data(&self, handshake_hash: &hash::Output, label: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> { |
| 222 | let mut out = vec![0u8; 12]; |
| 223 | |
| 224 | self.suite.prf_provider.for_secret( |
| 225 | &mut out, |
| 226 | &self.master_secret, |
| 227 | label, |
| 228 | handshake_hash.as_ref(), |
| 229 | ); |
| 230 | |
| 231 | out |
| 232 | } |
| 233 | |
| 234 | pub(crate) fn client_verify_data(&self, handshake_hash: &hash::Output) -> Vec<u8> { |
| 235 | self.make_verify_data(handshake_hash, b"client finished" ) |
| 236 | } |
| 237 | |
| 238 | pub(crate) fn server_verify_data(&self, handshake_hash: &hash::Output) -> Vec<u8> { |
| 239 | self.make_verify_data(handshake_hash, b"server finished" ) |
| 240 | } |
| 241 | |
| 242 | pub(crate) fn export_keying_material( |
| 243 | &self, |
| 244 | output: &mut [u8], |
| 245 | label: &[u8], |
| 246 | context: Option<&[u8]>, |
| 247 | ) { |
| 248 | let mut randoms = Vec::new(); |
| 249 | randoms.extend_from_slice(&self.randoms.client); |
| 250 | randoms.extend_from_slice(&self.randoms.server); |
| 251 | if let Some(context) = context { |
| 252 | assert!(context.len() <= 0xffff); |
| 253 | (context.len() as u16).encode(&mut randoms); |
| 254 | randoms.extend_from_slice(context); |
| 255 | } |
| 256 | |
| 257 | self.suite |
| 258 | .prf_provider |
| 259 | .for_secret(output, &self.master_secret, label, &randoms); |
| 260 | } |
| 261 | |
| 262 | pub(crate) fn extract_secrets(&self, side: Side) -> Result<PartiallyExtractedSecrets, Error> { |
| 263 | // Make a key block, and chop it up |
| 264 | let key_block = self.make_key_block(); |
| 265 | let shape = self.suite.aead_alg.key_block_shape(); |
| 266 | |
| 267 | let (client_key, key_block) = key_block.split_at(shape.enc_key_len); |
| 268 | let (server_key, key_block) = key_block.split_at(shape.enc_key_len); |
| 269 | let (client_iv, key_block) = key_block.split_at(shape.fixed_iv_len); |
| 270 | let (server_iv, explicit_nonce) = key_block.split_at(shape.fixed_iv_len); |
| 271 | |
| 272 | let client_secrets = self.suite.aead_alg.extract_keys( |
| 273 | AeadKey::new(client_key), |
| 274 | client_iv, |
| 275 | explicit_nonce, |
| 276 | )?; |
| 277 | let server_secrets = self.suite.aead_alg.extract_keys( |
| 278 | AeadKey::new(server_key), |
| 279 | server_iv, |
| 280 | explicit_nonce, |
| 281 | )?; |
| 282 | |
| 283 | let (tx, rx) = match side { |
| 284 | Side::Client => (client_secrets, server_secrets), |
| 285 | Side::Server => (server_secrets, client_secrets), |
| 286 | }; |
| 287 | Ok(PartiallyExtractedSecrets { tx, rx }) |
| 288 | } |
| 289 | } |
| 290 | |
| 291 | impl Drop for ConnectionSecrets { |
| 292 | fn drop(&mut self) { |
| 293 | self.master_secret.zeroize(); |
| 294 | } |
| 295 | } |
| 296 | |
| 297 | enum Seed { |
| 298 | Ems(hash::Output), |
| 299 | Randoms([u8; 64]), |
| 300 | } |
| 301 | |
| 302 | impl AsRef<[u8]> for Seed { |
| 303 | /// This is guaranteed to return a non-empty slice. |
| 304 | fn as_ref(&self) -> &[u8] { |
| 305 | match self { |
| 306 | // seed is a hash::Output, which is a fixed, non-zero length array. |
| 307 | Self::Ems(seed: &Output) => seed.as_ref(), |
| 308 | // randoms is a fixed, non-zero length array. |
| 309 | Self::Randoms(randoms: &[u8; 64]) => randoms.as_ref(), |
| 310 | } |
| 311 | } |
| 312 | } |
| 313 | |
| 314 | fn join_randoms(first: &[u8; 32], second: &[u8; 32]) -> [u8; 64] { |
| 315 | let mut randoms: [u8; 64] = [0u8; 64]; |
| 316 | randoms[..32].copy_from_slice(src:first); |
| 317 | randoms[32..].copy_from_slice(src:second); |
| 318 | randoms |
| 319 | } |
| 320 | |
| 321 | type MessageCipherPair = (Box<dyn MessageDecrypter>, Box<dyn MessageEncrypter>); |
| 322 | |
| 323 | pub(crate) fn decode_kx_params<'a, T: KxDecode<'a>>( |
| 324 | kx_algorithm: KeyExchangeAlgorithm, |
| 325 | common: &mut CommonState, |
| 326 | kx_params: &'a [u8], |
| 327 | ) -> Result<T, Error> { |
| 328 | let mut rd: Reader<'_> = Reader::init(bytes:kx_params); |
| 329 | let kx_params: T = T::decode(&mut rd, algo:kx_algorithm)?; |
| 330 | match rd.any_left() { |
| 331 | false => Ok(kx_params), |
| 332 | true => Err(common.send_fatal_alert( |
| 333 | desc:AlertDescription::DecodeError, |
| 334 | err:InvalidMessage::InvalidDhParams, |
| 335 | )), |
| 336 | } |
| 337 | } |
| 338 | |
| 339 | pub(crate) const DOWNGRADE_SENTINEL: [u8; 8] = [0x44, 0x4f, 0x57, 0x4e, 0x47, 0x52, 0x44, 0x01]; |
| 340 | |
| 341 | #[cfg (test)] |
| 342 | #[macro_rules_attribute::apply(test_for_each_provider)] |
| 343 | mod tests { |
| 344 | use super::provider::kx_group::X25519; |
| 345 | use super::*; |
| 346 | use crate::common_state::{CommonState, Side}; |
| 347 | use crate::msgs::handshake::{ServerEcdhParams, ServerKeyExchangeParams}; |
| 348 | |
| 349 | #[test ] |
| 350 | fn server_ecdhe_remaining_bytes() { |
| 351 | let key = X25519.start().unwrap(); |
| 352 | let server_params = ServerEcdhParams::new(&*key); |
| 353 | let mut server_buf = Vec::new(); |
| 354 | server_params.encode(&mut server_buf); |
| 355 | server_buf.push(34); |
| 356 | |
| 357 | let mut common = CommonState::new(Side::Client); |
| 358 | assert!( |
| 359 | decode_kx_params::<ServerKeyExchangeParams>( |
| 360 | KeyExchangeAlgorithm::ECDHE, |
| 361 | &mut common, |
| 362 | &server_buf |
| 363 | ) |
| 364 | .is_err() |
| 365 | ); |
| 366 | } |
| 367 | |
| 368 | #[test ] |
| 369 | fn client_ecdhe_invalid() { |
| 370 | let mut common = CommonState::new(Side::Server); |
| 371 | assert!( |
| 372 | decode_kx_params::<ServerKeyExchangeParams>( |
| 373 | KeyExchangeAlgorithm::ECDHE, |
| 374 | &mut common, |
| 375 | &[34], |
| 376 | ) |
| 377 | .is_err() |
| 378 | ); |
| 379 | } |
| 380 | } |
| 381 | |